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IV 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Plaintiff Randi Hebertson appeals an order granting summary judgment on 
behalf of defendants Bank One, Utah, N A . formerly known as Valley Bank & Trust Co. 
and Dime Savings Bank of New York, FSB, allegedly doing business as Willowcreek 
Plaza, Willowcreek Shopping Village, Ltd., and Willowcreek Plaza Executive Offices. 
The Honorable Timothy R. Hanson entered the order on April 8, 1998. 
This Court has jurisdiction over plaintiffs appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3(2)(j) by virtue of the Utah Supreme Court's transfer of plaintiff's appeal 
pursuant to Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Plaintiff filed a notice of 
appeal on May 7, 1998 in the trial court and subsequently submitted a Statement of 
Issues on Appeal on May 18, 1998, and a docketing statement on May 28, 1998. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for review: 
1. Is a complaint which is timely filed but which names as the only defendant 
a non-entity not capable of being sued eligible for refiling pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-12-40 when it is dismissed without prejudice after the 
expiration of the applicable statute of limitations? 
2. If § 78-12-40 does apply, does it allow plaintiff only one refiling or may she 
continually avoid the statute of limitations by filing successive complaints 
1 
so long as each refiling occurs within one year of the most recent 
dismissal? 
3. Regardless of the number of refilings plaintiff is allowed, may she name 
new parties not named in the original complaint after the statue of 
limitations has run, and do those efforts relate back to the original 
complaint thereby avoiding the expired four-year statute of limitations 
governing her claims? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss was treated by the trial court as a 
Rule 56 motion for summary judgment since matters outside the pleadings were 
considered. 
The trial court's ruling granting summary judgment on behalf of defendants is 
subject to review for correctness. Ong International (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Avenue Corp., 
850 P.2d 447, 452 (Utah 1993). Therefore, the trial court's legal determinations are 
given no deference and the grant of a summary judgment and the affirmance of such 
on appeal is appropriate only where there exists no genuine issues of material fact 
relevant to the disposition of the claims underlying the motion. L& A Drywall. Inc. v. 
Whitmore Constr. Co.. 608 P.2d 626 (Utah 1980). 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-40 (1953), otherwise known as the savings statute, is 
the determinative statutory provision presented for review. It states as follows: 
If any action is commenced within due time and a judgment 
thereon for the plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in 
such action or upon a cause of action otherwise than upon 
the merits, and the time limited whether by law or contract 
for commencement the same shall have expired, the 
plaintiff, or if he dies and the cause of action survives, his 
representatives, may commence a new action within one 
year after the reversal or failure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On May 23, 1997, plaintiff filed a complaint in the Third District Court alleging 
that on December 31,1988 she was injured in a slip and fall that occurred on premises 
owned by defendants. (R. 1-2) This was not plaintiffs first attempt to pursue litigation 
over this incident. In fact, plaintiff had filed three previous complaints, all in Third 
District Court, each seeking relief for her alleged injuries stemming from the December 
31, 1988 incident. (R. 2-5) Only the first complaint was timely filed within the 
applicable statute of limitations for personal injuries which is four years. (R. 2, 53-62) 
However, each of the first three complaints were dismissed without prejudice. 
The first two were dismissed pursuant to motions filed by parties not named in the 
actions but who were served with process. In the first and second actions plaintiff 
named as the sole defendant "Willowcreek Plaza," which in reality is merely the name 
on the building where plaintiffs slip and fall occurred. The third complaint was 
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voluntarily dismissed by plaintiff. (R. 5, 15) When plaintiff filed her fourth complaint 
naming new defendants not named in the original complaint, defendants moved to 
dismiss the complaint. (R. 12) Defendant's motion argued that plaintiff was only 
entitled to refile her complaint once under Utah's savings statute found at Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-40 (1953) and that even if she was entitled to multiple refilings, she could 
not name new parties who were not named in the original complaint or who did not 
have an identity of interest with the original defendant. (R. 15-20). 
The Honorable Judge Timothy R. Hanson granted defendants' motion. Since he 
considered matters outside the pleadings, defendant's motion to dismiss was treated as 
a motion for summary judgment. (R. 92/32 & 83) The order granting summary 
judgment was signed on April 8, 1998. (R. 82) 
It is from this order dismissing plaintiffs fourth complaint that she now appeals, 
having filed a notice of appeal on May 7, 1998. (R. 85) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiff's complaint alleges that she was injured in a slip and fall that 
occurred on the premises of a business complex known as "Willowcreek 
Plaza" on December 31, 1988. (R. 2) 
2. On or about November 20, 1992, nearly four years after the incident and 
only 38 days short of the expiration of the four-year statute of limitation set 
forth at Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(1) (1953), plaintiff filed a complaint in 
the Third District Court. (R. 3, 53) 
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3. This first of four complaints named as the sole defendant "Willowcreek 
Plaza." (R. 3) 
4. Plaintiff served her first complaint on Willowcreek Plaza, L.C, the owner 
of the premises at the time the complaint was filed. (R. 15) See, also 
Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza. 923 P.2d 1389, 1390 (Utah 1996), a 
copy of which is included as part of the record on appeal. (R. 71) 
5. However, Willowcreek Plaza, L.C, did not own the property at the time of 
the alleged incident and instead had purchased it from an interim owner 
who had purchased it, Valley Bank and Dime Savings Bank who jointly 
owned the premises at the time of plaintiffs slip and fall. (R. 72-73) 
6. Willowcreek Plaza L.C filed a motion to dismiss shortly thereafter arguing 
that it did not own the building at the time of the incident and that the 
named defendant "Willowcreek Plaza" was merely the name on the 
building and did not exist as an entity that could sue or be sued. (R. 3, 
15,72-73) 
7. The Honorable Judge Leslie Lewis granted the motion to dismiss that in 
fact "Willowcreek Plaza" did not have the capacity to be sued and that 
Willowcreek Plaza L.C. did not own the premises at the time of the 
incident. (See certified copies of Judge Lewis' ruling and order attached 
as Exhibit A to the addendum of defendant's brief herein.) 
8. The order dismissing plaintiffs first complaint without prejudice was 
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signed on September 22, 1993, over nine months after the statute of 
limitations expired. (R. 3-4; see also. Exhibit A of addendum) 
9. Plaintiff then filed her second complaint on September 17, 1993 and again 
named as the sole defendant "Willowcreek Plaza." (R. 4 & 56) 
10. However, this time plaintiff served Valley Bank. (R. 4 & 15) 
11. Because they were not named as parties, Valley Bank and Dime Savings 
moved to dismiss on the grounds that they were not doing business as 
"Willowcreek Plaza." Id. 
12. Plaintiff opposed the motion arguing that the banks were in fact doing 
business as "Willowcreek Plaza" pursuant to Rule 17(d) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. (R. 73) 
13. The Honorable Judge John A. Rokich ruled that the banks were indeed 
not doing business as "Willowcreek Plaza" and as such plaintiff could not 
bring suit against them in that name. (R. 4) He therefore dismissed 
plaintiffs second complaint without prejudice. IdL 
14. The order dismissing this second lawsuit without prejudice was entered on 
January 17, 1994. JJL 
15. Plaintiff then filed her third complaint on January 6,1994, this time naming 
Valley Bank and Dime Bank. (R. 5, 59) 
16. Plaintiff never pursued this action and instead chose to pursue an appeal 
of Judge Rokich's decision dismissing the second complaint. (R. 5) 
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17. Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her third complaint on February 22, 1994. 
(See, certified copy of plaintiffs Notice of Dismissal attached as Exhibit B 
to the addendum of defendant's brief herein.) 
18. Plaintiff's appeal of the dismissal of her second complaint was 
unsuccessful on two separate occasions. 
19. Specifically, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, agreeing 
that Valley Bank was not doing business as "Willowcreek Plaza" and 
therefore could not be sued in that name. Hebertson v. Willowcreek 
Plaza. 895 P.2d 839 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); see also (R. 63-65) 
20. Plaintiff thereafter filed a petition for writ of certiorari which was granted. 
Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza. 910 P.2d 425 (Utah 1995). 
21. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals ruling. Hebertson 
v. Willowcreek Plaza. 923 P.2d 1389 (Utah 1996); see also (R. 71-74) 
22. Plaintiff thereafter filed her fourth complaint on May 23, 1997. (R. 1 -7) 
23. Defendants again moved to dismiss plaintiffs fourth complaint arguing 
that the savings statute allows only one refiling and that the statute of 
limitations therefore barred plaintiffs fourth complaint. (R. 12-20) 
24. Defendants further argued that even if plaintiff was entitled to more than 
one refiling she could not add or name new parties not named in her first 
complaint, id, 
25. In opposition, plaintiff argued that the Utah savings statute allows for more 
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than one refiling and that regardless of how she referred to defendants in 
her various complaints, her cause of action had always been the same. 
(R. 23-33) 
26. Plaintiff also argued that the banks were doing business as "Willowcreek 
Plaza" and that her efforts in substituting the banks' names as the 
designated defendants in her fourth complaint did not impair her right to 
rely on the savings statute. (R. 29) 
27. Plaintiff also informed the trial court in her written opposition to 
defendants' motion to dismiss that she had initiated a legal malpractice 
lawsuit against her original attorney in the Third District Court styled 
Hebertson v. Dalby et. aL Civil No. 960908024, filed November 20, 1996, 
the Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki presiding. (R. 27) 
28. After reading the briefs and listening to the oral argument of the parties, 
The Honorable Timothy R. Hanson granted defendant's motion to dismiss 
plaintiffs complaint on March 13, 1998. (R. 92/32) 
29. Because matters outside the pleadings were considered, the trial court 
treated the motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment and ruled that 
plaintiff was entitled to only one refiling after her first complaint was 
dismissed. (R. 83) 
30. The trial court further ruled that even if plaintiff was entitled to more than 
one refiling, she could not name new parties after the expiration of the 
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statute of limitations. (R. 83) 
31. The order dismissing plaintiffs fourth complaint was entered on April 8, 
1998 and plaintiff filed her notice of appeal on May 7, 1998. id, 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs first complaint which was timely filed was a complete nullity for it 
named as the sole defendant "Willowcreek Plaza," the name of the building where 
plaintiff alleges her injuries were sustained. "Willowcreek Plaza" is a non-entity. It was 
not a business, a dba, or the common name of the actual owners of the premises. As 
such, "Willowcreek Plaza" could not sue or be sued. Therefore, the dismissal of 
plaintiffs first complaint after the expiration of the statute of limitations did not trigger 
the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 otherwise known as Utah's savings 
statute which allows suits not dismissed upon the merits to be refiled after the 
intervening statute of limitations has expired. 
Put in other words, a suit which names a non-existent defendant who cannot be 
sued and thereafter serves the complaint on an entity that has nothing to do with 
plaintiffs claims is a complete nullity as if it were never filed in the first place. Thus, 
when the statute of limitations expired, plaintiff had not timely initiated a lawsuit against 
defendants and the statute of limitations bars all subsequent efforts on her part to sue 
the proper parties. 
Even if plaintiff was entitled to refile her complaint under the savings statute, she 
is entitled to do so only once pursuant to the clear language of § 78-12-40. The Utah 
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Court of Appeals in the case of Meadow Fresh Farms v. Utah State University, 813 
P.2d 1216, 1221 n. 10 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) has already indicated, albeit in dicta, that 
the savings statute allows for only one filing. Such is consistent with the clear majority 
of jurisdictions who have addressed the issue to date. Thus, when plaintiffs second 
lawsuit was dismissed, and that ruling was upheld on appeal by both the Utah Court of 
Appeals and the Utah Supreme Court, plaintiff was barred by the statute of limitations 
from filing subsequent complaints. To rule otherwise and allow multiple successive 
refilings so long as each is brought within one year of the last dismissal would defeat 
the purpose and intent of statutes of limitation and could result in endless litigation. 
Finally, even if Utah's savings statute allows for more than one refiling, Utah law 
is clear that new parties may not be added or joined in subsequent filings after the 
expiration of the statute of limitations unless it can be shown that the causes of action 
are the same and the parties are either the same or bear a substantial identity of 
interest with the original parties. Here, plaintiff was unable to demonstrate that 
defendants were doing business as "Willowcreek Plaza" nor was she able to establish 
an identity of interest between a non-entity ("Willowcreek Plaza") and defendants who 
were the actual owners of the property at the time. This much has been confirmed by 
the Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Supreme Court, both of which have issued 
opinions addressing plaintiffs Rule 17(d) arguments following the dismissal of plaintiffs 
second complaint. Plaintiffs efforts to join defendants as parties in the second and 
third refilings of her original complaint are therefore improper and cannot stand in light 
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of the expired statute of limitations. 
In short, plaintiff sued a non-entity and served the wrong owner of the building 
when she initiated her first lawsuit. She has now filed a total of four lawsuits and each 
has been dismissed. Her procedural efforts have been scrutinized by three trial court 
judges and by both appellate courts of this state in an appeal, a petition for writ of 
certiorari, and the Supreme Court's review of the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
Plaintiff's legal and equitable arguments if accepted would eviscerate the statute of 
limitations and leave all potential defendants no end in sight to the litigation possibilities. 
Defendant therefore requests that the trial court's ruling be affirmed 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Plaintiff's first complaint naming a non-existent defendant 
is a complete nullity. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 therefore 
does not apply and Plaintiff's three subsequent refillings 
are barred by the statute of limitations 
Plaintiffs first complaint was filed on November 24, 1992, just 38 days prior to 
the four-year statute of limitations deadline for filing litigation with respect to the slip and 
fall she claims occurred on December 31, 1988. (R. 14-15) That complaint named as 
the sole defendant "Willowcreek Plaza." (R. 15) Because Willowcreek Plaza was a 
non-entity and was incapable of suing or being sued, plaintiffs first complaint was 
dismissed pursuant to a motion to dismiss filed by the new owners of the building who 
11 
had been served with process.1 
The order dismissing plaintiffs first complaint was issued in September of 1993, 
well over nine months after the applicable statute of limitations had expired. Because 
that complaint never named the appropriate defendant and in fact named a defendant 
that did not exist, the savings statute found at Utah Code Ann. §78-12-40 (1953) cannot 
operate to preserve a claim against a party who was never named, served, or joined as 
a party to the original action prior to the expiration of the statute of limitation. 
The case of Estate of Haro v. Haro. 887 P.2d 878 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), 
demonstrates this principle in action. In Haro. the Utah Court of Appeals upheld the 
dismissal of a wrongful death lawsuit due to the would-be claimant's failure to name a 
plaintiff that had the capacity to sue on behalf of the heirs of the deceased. Plaintiffs 
had sued in the name of the "Estate of Martin Haro." id. They filed their complaint six 
weeks before the statute of limitations ran. \± 
The defendants in Haro thereafter filed a motion to dismiss after the statute of 
limitations had run arguing that plaintiff had brought the suit in the name of an entity 
that did not have the capacity to sue. Plaintiffs moved to substitute the proper party 
pursuant to Rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court denied the 
motion to substitute and dismissed the suit, ruling that plaintiffs had not initiated suit 
1
 It goes without saying that even if plaintiff had named Willowcreek Plaza, L.C. 
in the first action the complaint would have been dismissed anyway because they did 
not own the property at the time of plaintiffs accident. 
12 
within the two year statute of limitations, h i The Haro court held that since the suit 
was brought by a party that lacked the capacity to bring the claim the lawsuit was "a 
nullity" and therefore there was no suit or "cause of action in which to substitute 
parties." \± at 879. Thus, even though the original suit was timely filed, the error in 
naming the proper party effectively wiped that suit clean from the books resulting in the 
expiration of the statute of limitations which barred further refilings. \_± at 879, n. 2. 
Dunn v. Kelly. 675 P.2d 571 (Utah 1983), is also on point. In Dunn, the original 
plaintiff filed a timely wrongful death lawsuit over the death of a purported relative. 
When it was determined that the plaintiff in the original action was in fact not related to 
the decedent, the case was dismissed without prejudice.2 \± Thereafter, a new second 
action was commenced, this time naming as plaintiffs the proper heirs. However, the 
second action was clearly filed after the two year statute of limitations had run. i d at 
572. The trial court dismissed the second complaint holding that the statute of 
limitations barred the second action and the Utah Supreme Court affirmed. The parties 
in the first action were not the same as those named in the second action and § 78-12-
40 therefore did not apply and could not be used to resurrect their claims. Jd, 
The Haro and Dunn decisions are consistent with case law from other 
jurisdictions who have addressed this issue from the perspective of a wrongly named 
defendant. In McCoy Enterprises v. Vaughn. 268 S.E.2d 764 (Ga. App. 1980), the 
2As in this case, the original suit in Dunn was dismissed well after the statute of 
limitations for wrongful death claims expired. \_± at p. 571-72 
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Georgia Court of Appeals reversed a trial court ruling that allowed the plaintiffs to file a 
second lawsuit under Georgia's savings statute after the statute of limitations had run 
and the first timely action had been dismissed. The first suit incorrectly named the 
officers of the corporation as the defendants rather than the corporation itself. JdL at 
765. In so ruling, the court discussed plaintiffs ineligibility for refilling under the savings 
statute. 
If the cause of action is the same in both cases; if by the 
same party or his legal representative, and against a person 
from whom relief was prayed in the first suit, the second 
action may be renewed. Since appellant corporation was 
never a party to the original suit, appellee cannot maintain a 
"renewal" action against it in light of the intervening statute 
of limitation. 
Id. (citations omitted) 
Similarly, in Jordan v. Commissioners of Bristol County. 167 N.E. 652 (Mass. 
1929), the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that actions which fail because they 
were brought against the wrong party are not eligible for the savings statute, id, at 654. 
In, Daw. NLOInc- 798 F.Supp. 1322 (S.D. Ohio 1992), the U.S. District Court 
for Ohio, ruled that even though the causes of action were the same, plaintiffs efforts to 
name different defendants in the second lawsuit rendered the Ohio savings statute 
inapplicable and the statute of limitations barred the second complaint. kL at 1328 
(citing Heilprin v. Ohio State University Hospitals. 508 N.E.2d 187 (Ohio 1986). 
The same result was reached in Brown v. Hartshorne Public School Dist. No. 1. 
926 F.2d 959 (10th Cir. 1981). In Brown, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted 
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Oklahoma's savings statute and held that the plaintiffs efforts to name new defendants 
in a second action who were not named in the first action was improper and the savings 
statute, while applicable to the second action generally, did not apply to causes of 
action raised against new parties. The second lawsuit was therefore dismissed as 
untimely insofar as to the new defendants the statute of limitations had run. \± See 
also. Goldsmith v. Learjet. Inc.. 90 F.3d 1490 (10th Cir. 1996) (interpreting the Kansas 
savings statute). 
In Bavel v. Cavaness. 299 N.E.2d 435 (III. App. Ct. 1973), an Illinois appellate 
court held that the original suit which was otherwise timely filed but which named as a 
defendant a party that did not legally exist and could not be sued, was a "complete 
nullity" and the plaintiffs second or refilled suit naming the proper defendant was 
therefore not eligible for the Illinois savings statute and was properly barred by the 
statute of limitations. \± at 438. The ruling of the Bavel court is worth noting here. 
A case which was legally never in existence cannot be 
dismissed or nonsuited for it was a nullity from its inception 
and incapable of legally being acted upon. Here, . . . where 
there was no defendant there was no action capable of 
being heard on the merits. Failure to name a defendant is 
not a mere technicality in procedure or form but 
constitutes rather a total absence of a cause of action. 
The [savings] statute referring to a "new" action pre-
supposes an old or prior action filed within the original 
limitation period and here, as a matter of law, there was no 
such prior action. It is therefore evident that plaintiffs did not 
commence a "new" action when they filed the complaint now 
before us, but 
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rather commenced the only action, which action was filed 
well beyond the limitation period allowed. 
Id. at 438. Allowing plaintiffs arguments here would eviscerate the statute of 
limitations. 
Even though plaintiff has not arg ed that Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which allows amendments to the pleadings to relate back to the original 
complaint, applies to her situation, case law interpreting Rule 15(c) is illustrative of this 
point. 
Generally Rule 15(c), U.R.C.P., will not apply to an 
amendment which substitutes or adds new parties for those 
brought before the court by the original pleadings-whether 
plaintiff or defendant. This [is] for the reason that such 
would amount to the assertion of a new cause of action, and 
if such were allowed to relate back to the filing of the 
complaint, the purpose of a statute of limitation would be 
defeated. 
Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co.. 681 P.2d 214, 217 (Utah 1984)(citing Doxey-
Lavton Co. v. Clark. 548 P.2d 902, 906 (1976)). 
Plaintiffs efforts to properly name and serve defendants here are untimely and 
improper. Plaintiff may not renew an action under the savings statute that never 
existed in the first place. She cannot now sue the proper defendants having failed to 
name, serve, or join them as defendants in the initial action prior to the running of the 
statute of limitations. Plaintiffs naming of a defendant who did not exist, and was not a 
legal entity capable of suing or being sued, rendered that initial action a complete 
nullity. The statute of limitations bars her efforts to now correct that error. 
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POINT II 
Even if the savings statute applies, plaintiff is only 
entitled to one re-filing of her complaint, not four. 
As indicated in the procedural history, this appeal is from plaintiffs fourth 
complaint. Therefore, even if §78-12-40 were applicable and plaintiff was entitled to 
refile her complaint after the first one was dismissed, the savings statute only allows for 
one refiling, not three. 
Utah's savings statute provides: 
If any action is commenced within due time and a judgment 
thereon for the plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in 
such action or upon a cause of action otherwise than upon 
the merits, and the time limited either by law or contract for 
commencement the same shall have expired, the plaintiff, or 
if he dies and the cause of action survives, his 
representatives, may commence a new action within one 
year after the reversal or failure. 
Id. Perusal of this language indicates that the intent of the statue is to allow one 
refiling, not three as plaintiff has done here. 
While this question has not buen directly addressed by Utah appellate courts, 
this Court in dicta has indicated that plaintiff is only entitled to one refiling. Specifically, 
in Meadow Fresh Farms. 813 P.2d 1216, the Honorable Judge Judith Billings writing for 
a unanimous panel stated in a footnote that §78-12-40 allowed for only one re-filing. 
Although we refrain from addressing the merits of whether 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 permits unlimited successive 
dismissals and refilings, we note that many of the courts that 
have been faced with a similar question have concluded that 
in the interest of finality and judicial economy, a plaintiff is 
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entitled to only one refiling pursuant to a savings statute. 
See e ^ , Hunter v. Ward. 15 F.2d 843, 844 (8th Cir. 1926); 
Marangio v. Shop Rite Supermarkets. Inc.. 11 Conn.App. 
156, 55 A.2d 1389, 1391 (1987), cert denied. 204 Conn. 
809, 528 A.2d 1155 (1987); Sylvester v. Steinberg. 152 
lll.App.3rd 962, 105 III.Dec. 902, 903, 505 N.E.2d 28,29 
(1987); United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Swyden. 175 Okla. 
475, 53 P.2d 284, 288 (1935). This conclusion is consistent 
with the language of the Utah saving statute as the statute 
speaks in terms of a singular rather than multiple dismissals: 
"a new action," "the reversal or failure". 
i d at 1221, n.10 (emphasis in original). Here, the trial coui specifically found this 
footnote, albeit dicta, to be much more persuasive than contrary holdings from other 
states. (R. 92/30)3 
Plaintiff has cited in her brief to le cases of Roberts v. General Motors Corp.. 
673 A.2d 779 (N.H. 1996), and Trull v. Seaboard Air Line R.Y. Co.. 66 S.E. 586 (N.C. 
1909), in support of her argument that she is entitled to an unlimited number of refilings 
so long as each new action is brought within one year of the previous dismissal. 
Roberts4 and Trull cannot be distinguished or reconciled with contrary holdings from 
other states and the Meadow Fresh dicta. However, the logic underpinning both 
decisions is irrational and emasculates the principles behind statutes of limitation. They 
3
 At the hearing, Judge Hanson stated the following with respect to Meadow 
Fresh. "Dicta from Judge Billings is much more persuasive than the holding from some 
out-of-state court. It's particularly persuasive when I think she's right." (R. 121) 
4
 The Roberts court was not unanimous in its decision. Instead, one justice 
issued a well reasoned dissent addressing concerns of endless litigation and 
harmonizing the savings statute with the applicable statute of limitations, id. 
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also represent the clear minority when compared to jurisdictions who allow for only one 
refilling. 
The following decisions hold that only one refilling is allowed under a savings 
statute. Morrow v. Atlanta & C. Air Line Rv. Co.. 66 S.E. 186 (S.C. 1909)(interpreting 
South Carolina law); United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Swvden. 475, P.2d 284, 288 
(1935)(interpreting Oklahoma law); Turnery. N.C. & St. L. Railway. 285 S.W.2d 122 
(Tenn. 1955)(interpreting Tennessee law); Worlev v. Pierce. 440 S.E.2d 749 (Ga. App. 
1994)(interpreting Georgia law); Rogozinski v. American Food Service Equip.. 643 A.2d 
300 (Conn. App. 1994)(interpreting Connecticut law); Cadvv. Harlan. 442 S.W.2d 517 
(Mo. 1969)(interpreting Missouri law); Hunter v. Ward. 15 F.2d 843 (8th Cir. 
1926)(interpreting Arkansas law); Sylvester v. Steinberg. 505 N.E.2d 28 (III. App., 4 
Dist. 1987)(interpreting Illinois law); Bush v. Cole. 110 N.E. 1056 (Ohio 1912) 
(interpreting Ohio law). 
Language from the Swyden opinion addresses the philosophical underpinnings 
of this majority position which allows only on refilling, not multiple refilings. 
We must remember that the grace period is not a release of 
the original limitation, nor even an extension thereof for all 
purposes, but is only a conditional, limited extension granted 
plaintiff because the suit which he did file in time, consumed 
some time in court before dismissal, carrying him beyond the 
original limitation date, possibly without any fault of his own. 
That he could file and dismiss as often as he desired within 
the original period of limitation has nothing to do with it, for 
at that time there was no bar at all. Once, however, he 
passes the bar he is on the law's own time, and is permitted 
to ignore the statute only by virtue of legislative exception 
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especially created for the occasion. Thus, good reason 
appears to support the general rule and interpretation of 
such statutes, to the effect that the legislatures of the 
various states, in extending litigants the privilege of filing 
actions out of time, mean just what they express by the 
words "commence a new action,"and that they do not 
thereby intend that plaintiffs may file as many new actions 
as they desire, all within the year. Had that been their 
intention, then such statutes would have been worded in the 
language of the ordinary statutes of limitation, with minor 
changes. To give such an interpretation as desired by 
plaintiff would do violence to the letter, spirit, meaning, and 
purpose of the statute. 
Swvden 53 P.2d at 2885. 
Similarly, the Rogozinski court ruled that only one refiling is allowed by the 
Connecticut savings statute. "Here the fire occurred twelve years ago and this is the 
fourth action started in state court to resolve the dispute. All of the previous dismissals 
were due to some failure to act on the part of the plaintiff. Thus, it is clear that this is 
not the situation that [the savings statute] was intended to remedy." Rogozinski. 643 
A.2d at 303, n. 9. 
In Pintavalle v. Valkanos. 581 A.2d 1050 (Conn. 1990), the Connecticut 
Supreme Court stated that plaintiffs interpretation of the savings statute "would have 
the effect of permitting a potentially limitless extension of the time to file succeeding 
5Although the facts in Swvden involved multiple refilings (three not including the 
original) within the one year savings period, the Oklahoma Supreme Court cited 
affirmatively to other cases where the first refilling occurred outside the original one 
year savings period. Thus, it does not matter if the second or third refilings occurred 
within or without the savings period because the statute allowed but one refilling. 
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actions. This would defeat the basic purpose of statutes of limitation, namely, 
promoting finality in the litigation process. Although § 52-592 is a remedial statute and 
must be construed liberally; it should not be construed so liberally as to render statutes 
of limitation virtually meaningless." kL at 1052 (citations omitted). 
If accepted, plaintiffs arguments here would essentially render the statute of 
limitations meaningless. It should be noted that §78-12-40 is found within the heart of 
the Limitation of Actions chapter of the Judicial Code. It therefore must be construed 
and harmonized to work within the overall purpose of the act. 
Plaintiff has exercised her one opportunity to file a lawsuit beyond the applicable 
statute of limitations assuming § 78-12-40 applies. That filing was dismissed. Plaintiff 
sought appellate review and obtained two opinions from both appellate courts of this 
state denying her claims and upholding the dismissal. Since plaintiff is now on her third 
refilling from which this appeal is taken, she has clearly exceeded the ambit of § 78-12-
40 and the trial court's ruling should be upheld. 
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POINT III 
Whether FSaintiff is allowed one or multiple refilings under § 78-12-40, 
she nevertheless cannot name new parties who were not named in the 
original complaint and who have no identity of interest to 
the defendant named in her first complaint. 
Plaintiff argues that her efforts to name the correct defendants in this action 
should relate back to the first complaint which was filed within the applicable statute of 
limitations. However, the law is clear that one may not add new parties to a lawsuit and 
have that amendment relate back to the original filing for purposes of preserving the 
statute of limitations. 
At first blush, plaintiffs arguments appear to rely on Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. This rule governs the relation back of amendments to pleadings and 
allows a party to amend their existing pleadings and have them relate back to original 
complaint or filing. However, plaintiff has not argued Rule 15(c) and rightly so. Case 
law explicitly states that Rule 15(c) does not generally allow amendments to the 
pleadings to include new parties since such amendments would amount to the 
a .sertion of a new cause of action and defeat the very purpose of a statute of limitation. 
Perry. 681 P.2dat218. 
However, a narrow exception to this general rule allows new parties to be added 
and related back to the original complaint where there is an identity of interest between 
the old and new parties. \± at 217. Here, there is no identity of interest between 
defendants who actually owned the property at the time of the accident and 
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"Willowcreek Plaza", a name on a building and the only named defendant 
plaintiff's \.-o\ bil l ing, "Willowcreek Plazn" is a nr- ^* nit • - r. ^ sue 
or hp sued. Furthermore, both tnis Cour ' ' ' -;~,i,i^u 
plaintiff's prior assertions that the banks were doing business as W'illowcreek Plaza. 
See Hebertson v. Willowcree Piazr- - * - fcert, granted 
at 910 P.2d 425). Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza. 923 >- :d •oiu
 vUtbh 1996). 
! he L)u* .,. < . _;^ ;...;:.^, .. i-M- * * ;s issue ° ~ ?opea? the 
i Jtah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the second artirn 
.
 f
 expressly rejected the plaintiff's claims that they were entitled to refile 
their complaint under Utah Code Ann. W{ ' " * 
or legal relationship" with the plaintiff in the first and timely filed lawsuit. 
The appellants concede they sought no relief ar id in fact 
were not parties to the prior action. They also concede they 
have no legal relationship to the original plaintiff. . ., Absent 
any identity or legal relationship between these appellants 
and the plaintiff in the first suit, it is impossible for this Court 
to apply § 78-12-40 to them. They simply had no interest in 
the first suit and are now barred from litigating this case 
because it is not timely asserted. 
Dunn. 675 P.2d at '77?. 
Admittedly, Dunn deals with a change in plaintiffs as parties However, the logic 
of tl le Dunn o| >n m"n i .I louid incorrect defendant who bears no 
legal relationship to the ultimately proper defendant. 
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Williams v. Zortman Mining. Inc.. 914 P.2d 971 (Mont. 1996) is also on point. In 
Zortman. the plaintiff sued the parent company of a wholly owned subsidiary 
corporation. Zortman actually was employed by the subsidiary and his claims of 
discrimination in the workplace was in reality against his employer, not its parent 
company. The federal court dismissed Zortman's claims for his attempt to "manipulate 
the diversity jurisdiction of the federal court." kL at 972. He thereafter sued the 
subsidiary (his employer and the proper party) in state court after the statute of 
limitations expired, jd . 
Citing Turner v. Aldor Co. of Nashville. Inc.. 827 S.W.2d 318, 321 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. 1991), the Zortman court stated : "We . . . .agree that the 'savings statute' does 
not apply to save or 'renew' a complaint against a party not named in the original 
complaint." \± at 973. Zortman goes on to agree with McCoy referenced elsewhere in 
this brief that the second suit should be dismissed even if the proper corporate 
defendant had actual notice of the first suit since the first suit failed to name it or a 
company with whom it held a sufficient identity of interest and the statute of limitations 
expired before the proper party was sued. I d 
Plaintiff urges this Court to apply the equities of the identity of interest rule and 
the general principle of fairness that cases ought to be heard on the merits, not 
disposed of based on technical applications of the law to the facts at hand. While 
defendants would agree with this principle as a general rule, such equities do not apply 
to the requirements of naming the correct parties and satisfying the statute of 
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limitations. 
Specifically, plaintiff cites the case of Madsen v. Borthick. 769 P.2d 253-54 (Utah 
1988)forthe proposition that the Utah Suprnmn f:m ri M iilm/wri ,i pi iiiii in nhi i 
"new defendant" to the second suit filed after the statute • • (imitation^ had run 
However, a close ~'<~-*•• * ^ ., *. .x. : . . fh9 
naming of new parties under Rule 15(c) was never raised or addressed by the litigants 
or tin- IIIII hi > 'iuu-'( | mi. in nil i •• itMuiences to Madsen for the proposition that the 
Utah Supreme Court allowed the suit to proceed despite the fact that "o' v p.irtio1* WM» * 
c ; .•; . XJ and misleading. Defendant is unaware of any case law or rules 
which allow precedent to be established throi • - »r 
discussed in opinions issued by the appellate courts of this state. 
The equities refer*- - . matiis v. State Farm Ins. 
Co.. 656 P.2d 966 (Utah -e likewise distinguishable. Plaintiff argues that the 
d — '- I ) lliiu instant action were done for mere form-
of-pleading errors.8 However, Williams did ilot address errors in such critica* - ^ s 
See - ' -1 |» 9 
7
 The plaintiff's first complaint against Commissioner Borthick in his official 
capacity and the State of Utah was dismissed due to the plaintiff's failure to comply ^ iti i 
the provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act which requires budding litigants 
wishing to sue the State to file a written notice of claim within one year of the incident 
giving rise to their claims. Madsen v. Bothick. 658 P.2d 627, 633 (I Jtah 1983). 
" 6 e e ; • 8 
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as naming and suing the proper parties. Instead, Williams dealt with the proper 
pleading of factual allegations associated with the affirmative defenses of fraud and 
misrepresentation.9 IdL at 967. The court ruled that the defenses were sufficiently 
plead to put plaintiff on notice of the same. Nowhere in Williams do the relaxed or 
"liberalized pleading rules" extend to allow a plaintiff to pursue a lawsuit even though 
they have sued a nor entity or named the wrong defendant. 
The case of Jordan v. Commissioner > of Bristol County. 167 N.E. 652 (Mass. 
1929), is illustrative of the point that the naming of the proper defendant is not a "form-
of-pleading" error. 
However, plaintiff, cause of action and defendant cannot be 
regarded as "form" within this definition. Misnomer or 
misdescription of any of these substantive elements may be 
"matter of form," but the mistaken choice of a defendant 
unrelated to the subject-matter of the case is not merely a 
formal error. 
\_± at 654. Utah courts agree with this position. See. Perry. 681 P.2d at 217. Rule 
15(c) does not allow the naming of new parties to relate back to the original filing 
absent an identity of interest between the old and new parties. See also. Haro, 887 
P.2d at 879, n.2. (Plaintiffs first suit was a nullity and plaintiff could not revive their 
action after the statute of limitations period where the first suit was brought by a plaintiff 
who lacked the capacity to sue.) 
9Williams sued State Farm Insurance Company to collect the face amount of a 
life insurance policy. In its answer, State Farm alleged that the decedent 
misrepresented his medical history on his application for the policy. 
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While this case represents the improper naming ui a d^f- - ; luro 
-
!
" - : -^ify c*re on point and demonstrate that naming the proper party is critical to 
maintaining an action and such errors is p i f ^ l im ) camml In d i s n u ^ ' d ds «^»>»" >>• 
excusable under the relaxed "form-of-pleading" rules, 
Plaintiff's \w * nil fill \\ .icinih '' ill ni'Lh;<4 Pl.i n u/.i^ a nullit, li was brought 
against an entity that did not exist and lacked the capacity to be sued. As such there is 
r , ^nt or addition of new parties could relate 
back to sufficient to avoid the statute of limitations which ran shortly ntter plaintiff l i l"d 
f plaint and years before she finally named the proper defendants. While 
plaintiff likely views these arguments as i r t 
vi ith Utah law and the purpose of statutes of limitation. See, Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 
572, 575 (Utah 1 9 " " ~ - . '
 : i t to sue, 
but simply provide that if an action -.- - filed within the specified t ime, the remedy is 
f j^ in imy ml I he remedy is caused by a plaintiffs 
failur t ) take reasonable steps to assert the cause of action within the time r.^ 
onJus ion , plaintiff failed to take "reasonable steps" to ns -
. rst complaint six years ago. She namea a on-eniitv •• 
lacked the capacity to be sued and she servod m i »i ilil ,< II i I I I »l »?ii m m ml 
relationship to the accident in question This utter failure or ~.er D^t to properly iilitiate 
her lawsuit whpn ^hc m / • statute of 
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limitations expiration date is fatal to her claims and all other efforts including the 
second, third and fourth complaints cannot revive an action that by law is a nullity and 
was never filed in compliance with the statute of limitations in the first place. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff never complied with the statute of limitations in the first place insofar as 
these defendants are concerned. Even if the savings statute applies to her first 
dismissal she is entitled to only one refilling, not three. Finally, her efforts to correct her 
mistake in naming the wrong defendants through amendment or relation back to her 
original complaint are not proper. Utah law clearly prohibits her efforts to add new 
parties in subsequent refilings. Therefore, the trial court's dismissal of plaintiffs 
complaint for statute of limitations purposes should be affirmed. 
DATED this Z - day of November, 1998. 
SMITH & GLAUSER, P.C. 
JOHN CLYDE HANSEN 
DANIEL L. STEELE 
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Timothy C. Houpt 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 







CASE NO. 920906515 
A Notice to Submit having been filed, pursuant to Rule 4-501, 
Code of Judicial Administration, in connection with defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss, and plaintiff's Motion to Amend, and the Request 
for Hearing, the Court having reviewed the Motions, the Affidavits 
in support and Reply Memorandum and the Memoranda in opposition, 
and the Court being fully advised and finding good cause, rules as 
stated herein. 
The Court denies the Motion for Hearing. The defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss is granted for the reasons stated in defendant's 
Memorandum, without prejudice. This Motion having been granted, 
this Court does not.address the Motion to Amend. 
Dated this .day of September, 1993 
<<—•/„ /."V> «S 
LESLIE A. LEWIS 
DISTRICT COURT JTJDG 
'$/%. -/mti&<i®o 
HEBERTSON V. WILLOWCREEK PAGE TWO COURT'S RULING 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct popy of the 
foregoing Court's Ruling, to the following, this / day of 
September, 1993: 
Ronald E. Dalby 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
4516 South 700 East, Suite 280 
P.O. Box 17345 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Brian S. King 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
4 Triad Center, Suite 825 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
John Clyde Hansen 
Attorney for Defendant 
13 6 S. Main, 8th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
g 1\*\(tfjwm 
C©FY 
John Clyde Hansen, No. 5286 
MORGAN & HANSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
136 South Main Street 
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 531-7888 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 











Leslie A. Lewis 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss having been decided by the Court 
pursuant to Rule 4-501(3) (c), Utah Code Jud. Adm. , and the Court 
having issued a written ruling dated September 1, 1993, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-entitled action be, and the 
same is, dismissed without prejudice. 
DATED this tfec^ o^f September, 1993. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing/TDRDER 
OF DISMISSAL was mailed, postage prepaid, on September / , 
1993, to the following: 
Ronald E. Dalby 
Matthew J. Storey 
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICES 
4516 South 700 East, Suite 280 
P.O. Box 17345 (84117-0345) 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Brian S. King 
KING & ISAACSON 
4 Triad Center, Suite 825 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
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TabB 
Ronald E. Dalby (Bar No. 0807 
Matthew J. Storey (Bar No. 4678) 
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4516 South 700 East, Suite 280 
P.O. Box 17345 (84117-0345) 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Telephone (801) 261-0088 
Brian S. King (Bar No. 4610) 
KING & ISAACSON 
Co-Counsel for Plaintiff 
4 Triad Center, Suite 825 
Salt Lake City, UT 84180 
Telephone (801) 532-1700 
Facsimile (801) 532-1780 
s .-.•'• 
BY 
'•£3 p 'n . . 
'-•^HK 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 




BANK ONE, UTAH, NATIONAL 
ASSOCIATION, fka VALLEY BANK & 
TRUST COMPANY, and THE DIME 
SAVINGS BANK OF NEW YORK, FSB, 
dba WILLOWCREEK PLAZA, WILLOW 
CREEK SHOPPING VILLAGE, LTD., 
WILLOW CREEK PLAZA EXECUTIVE 
OFFICES, 
NOTICE OF DISMISSAL 
Civil No. 940900104 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
Defendant. 
Plaintiff, through her undersigned counsel, gives notice pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure of the dismissal without prejudice of Plaintiffs actions 
against Defendants. 
DATED this _ £ day of February, 1994. 
KING & ISAACSON 
(l* - $• £l 
Brian S. King 
Attorneys for Plaintiff r 
* I CERTIFY TKATTt.-* - • ^ E COPY OF AN\ 
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